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NOTE AND COMMENT
SUBSTITUTED BENEFICIARIES UNDER THE
LAW OF WILLS
A question of considerable interest to lawyers and laymen
in the State of Montana concerns the effect of the common
law and our statutes on the disposition of real and personal
property where a testator has willed it to a beneficiary, who
dies before the testator.
At the outset it must be remembered, that the disposition
of property by will, in Montana, rests entirely with the legis-
lature; it may grant the right, with or without limitations; it
may deny the right, and it has the sole power to designate
those who may take by will.1
Further, a testamentary disposition under the laws of Mon-
tana, may be made to any person capable of taking the prop-
erty so disposed of, with certain prohibitions and limitations.'
Before a testator's death the beneficiary mentioned in the will
has a "mere privilege" of receiving revocable by law.' Upon
the testator's death, the gift vests in the beneficiary, subject
of course to the executor's possession for administration, until
the estate is settled, or until the estate is delivered by order
of court to the beneficiary.'
At common law, a lapse or failure most frequently occur-
red, where the beneficiary of real or personal property, or both,
predeceased the testator, and there was no substitutionary or
saving clause in the will.! While there were certain exceptions
to the general rule and the specific exception mentioned, they
are not involved here, but are noted for possible reference.
A. Exceptions, inclusive of the substitutionary clause
mentioned, are discussed and commented upon at
length in PAGE ON WiLLs, Lifetime Edition, Vol. 4,
Sections 1415 to 1421, inclusive.
B. The application of the anti-lapse or anti-failure stat-
ute is not mandatory in every case, as, where the
'In re Hauge's Estate (1932) 92 Mont. 36, 9 P. (2d) 1065.
'. C. M. 1935, §6977: A testamentary disposition may be made to any
person capable of taking the property so disposed of, except corpora-
tions other than those formed for scientific, literary, or solely educa-
tional purposes, cannot take under a will, unless expressly authorized
by statute.
'Hinds v. Wilcox, (1898) 22 Mont. 4, 55 P. 355.
'R. C. M.. 1935, §7040: Testamentary dispositions, including devises and
bequests to a person on attaining majority, are presumed to vest at
the testator's death; In re Deschamp's Estate, (1922) 65 Mont. 207,
212 Pac. 512.
'Snow v. Snow, (1861) 49 Me. 159, 163; Anderson v. Parsons (1827) 4
Greenl. (Me.) 486; 4 PAGE, WILLS, (Lifetime Ed.,) 1414, p. 162; 1 JAR-
MAN, WILLS, (5th Am. Ed.) Ch. XI.
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will shows that the testator did not intend that the
property should pass as provided by such statute.
C. The enactment, however, will apply in a proper case,
unless the testator's intention to eliminate it from
the operation of the provisions of his will, is shown
with reasonable certainty.
Under the common law rule mentioned, the property
whether a bequest of personal property or a devise of real es-
tate, would have .lapsed or failed. Likewise, if it be assumed
that the will in question contains no substituted beneficiary,
nor any general residuary clause, both the legacy and devise
pass as intestate property of the testator, that is, as if the tes-
tator had died intestate.! Again, if it be assumed that the
testator making the will left surviving him no heirs nor next
of kin, at the time of his death, then at common law, the prop-
erty, both real and personal would escheat to the state.7
In nearly all of the states, anti-lapse or anti-failure stat-
utes have been enacted, which variously modify or eliminate
the common law rule, that a legacy or devise lapsed if the ben-
eficiary died before the testator, and there was no substitu-
tionary clause in the will. Such anti-lapse or anti-failure
statutes rest upon the presumption that the testator would
have made some provision in his will for relatives of his bene-
ficiary who predeceased him, had he, the testator had notice
of the decease of his beneficiary, and an opportunity to make
the provisions of such statute, a part of his will.' Our Code
provision" can with accuracy be said to be but a short-hand
rendering of the common law rule referred to: that a gift failed
if the beneficiary predeceased the testator and the will con-
tained no provision for avoiding lapse," this being subject,
of course to the proviso, "except as provided in section 7012."
This exception is considered later.
Section 7042 R. C. M. 1935, by its use of the words "devi-
°4 PAGr, WILLs (Lifetime Ed.) §1426 p. 190, §1427, p. 190.
'4 PAGE, WrILs (Lifetime Ed.) §1427, p. 190.
'28 R. C. L. WW8, p. 343, §337; 26 CAl.. Jun. Wils p. 949, §255, note
20; 92 A. L. R. p. 846, anno.
'Hester v. Sammons (1938) 171 Va. 142, 198 S. E. 466, 118 A. L. R. 554;
Waxson Realty Co. v. Rothschild (1931) 255 N. Y. 332, 174 N. E.
700; Beardsley v. Wright (1918) 89 N.J. Eq. 58, 103 A. 809.
"R. C.M. 1935 §7042: If a devisee or legatee dies during the lifetime
of the testator, the testamentary disposition to him fails, unless an
intention appears to substitute some other in his place, except as pro-
vided in section 7012.
"28 R. C. L., Wills, p. 336, §327; In re Murphy's Estate (1909) 157 Cal.
63, 106 P. 230, 137 Am. St. Rep. 110; 4 PAGE WrLs (Lifetime Ed.)
§1420, p. 175.
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see or legatee" clearly embraces within its terms, (subject, of
course, to the excepted code provision 7012 R. C. M. 1935, here-
inafter considered) both real and personal property."
Therefore, except as provided in the language of section
7042 R. C. M. 1935, i.e., where "an intention appears to substi-
tute some other in his place," and except as provided in Section
7012 R. C. M. 1935, section 7042 constitutes the law of this jur-
isdiction in respect to lapses.
It covers and embraces all cases involving personal prop
e,ty, and all cases of real property, except those lifted from its
operation through section 7012 R. C. M. 1935, which is limited
in its scope to a restricted class of cases coming within its
terms,' and in those cases, it applies only to a devisee of real
property and has no application to personal property. This re-
sults from the wording and decisions of the Supreme Court of
this jurisdiction interpreting the language of section 7012 as
applying only to cases of real property devisees.1'
Because of the foregoing, it is well settled that a bequest of
personal property, in such case fails or lapses under the pro-
visions of Section 7042 R. C. M. 1935. It being assumed that
there is no substituted legatee, and no residuary clause, the per-
sonal property, had testator left heirs, would have descended to
such heirs of testator under the laws governing intestacy," but
as we are assuming at this point that testator left no heirs, the
personal property, upon the completion of the administration of
the estate, would be subject to escheat."
In addition to being limited to "devisees" of real estate,
Section 7012, R. C. M. 1935, is further restricted in its opera-
tion and scope. Under its terms, the beneficiary who prede-
ceases the testator, must be, in relationship to the testator, "a
child or other relation" and further, such "child or other re-
lation" of such testator must have left surviving "lineal de-
scendants."
"24 PAGE, WIuS (Lifetime Ed.) §1422, p. 177, citing Jones v. Jones' Ex-
ecutors, 37 Ala. 646; In re Pratt's Estate (1921) 60 Mont. 526, 199
P. 711.
"R. C. M. 1935, §7012: When any estate is devised to any child, or oth-
er relation of the testator, and the devisee dies before the testator,
leaving lineal descendants, such descendants take the estate so given
by the will, In the same manner as the devisee would have done had
he survived the testator.
"In re Pratt's Estate (1921) 60 Mont. 526, 199 P. 711; In re Hash's
Estate (1922) 64 Mont. 118, 208 P. 605.
"In re Pratt's Estate (1921) 60 Mont. 526, 199 P. 711; 4 PAGE, WLS
(Lifetime Ed.) 51427, p. 190.
I'R. C. M., 1935 §28: Whenever the title to any property fails for want
of heirs or next of kin it reverts to the state .....
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The word "child" as used in said section 7012, R. C. M.
1935 has been almost uniformly interpreted as meaning the
natural or full blooded child of the testator." However, under
our-statutes the word would include the illegitimate child of a
mother testatrix, and the father testator of such child under
conditions described in the statutes." Also, under our Codes
the word "child" would include an adopted child." The word
"child" does not include, according to the decisions, ,a step-
child, grandchild, nephew, nieces, or any collateral relation of
the testator, such as a brother."
The term "or other relation" of the testator as used in the
statute, is not used in a general comprehensive way, since it
was applied by our Supreme Court as denoting relationship by
either blood or affinity in connection with the construction of
a will,' nor can Section 7033, R. C. *M. 1935," be brought into
the picture of either the word "child" or the words "or other
relations" for purposes of interpretation, as the same is in-
applicable in the construction of statutory terms, only apply-
ing in the case of testamentary dispositions.'
The term "or other relations" as used in Section 7012,
R. C. M. 1935, only includes relationship by blood" and not by
affinity, though there are some cases (but not the weight of
authority) which use the succession statutes such as Sections
7073 and 7074, as the base or guide for the interpretation of
the statutory expression "or other relations."
Where real property is concerned, everything depends on
whether the beneficiary was a "child or other relation." If
he was not, then it is clear that, though the devise was real
estate, the case could not be brought within the operation of
"115 A. L. R. p. 451, anno. sub-division 8 "child; issue."
"R. C. M. 1935 §5863; 4 PAGE, WIMiA (Lifetime Ed.) §1425, p. 187, note
6; for cases contra 115 A. L. R. p. 451, anno sub-division 8, "Child;
Issue."
"R. C. M., 1935, § §7074, 5865 and 5852: for cases contra 115 A. L. R. p.
451 anno. sub-division 8 "Child; Issue."
'115 A. L. R. p. 451 anno sub-division 8, "Child; Issue."
"In re Bernheim's Estate (1928) 82 Mont. 198; 266 P. 378, 57 A. L. R.
1169.
-§7033 R. C. M., 1935: A testamentary disposition to "heirs," "rela-
tions," "nearest relations," "representatives," or "family," "Issue,"
"descendants," "nearest," or "next of kin," of any person without
words of qualification, and when the terms are used as words of do-
nation, and not of limitation, vests the property in those who would
be entitled to succeed to the property of such person, according to the
provisions of the chapter on succession in this code.
"In re Sowash's Estate (1923) 62 Cal. App. 512, 217 P. 123.
'115 A. L. R. p. 452, anno., In which the entire field of relationship,
both by blood and affinity, with authorities, are collected and dis-
cussed.
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the anti-failure statute," and it is likewise clear that the devise
would lapse under the provisions of Section 7042, R. C. M. 1935.
Again excluding the existence of a substituted devisee or
a residuary clause, it is apparent that the real estate, had testa-
tor left heirs, would have descended to such heirs under the laws
governing intestacy," but, as in the case of personal property,
where the testator leaves no heirs, the real estate, upon the
completion of administration, would likewise be subject to es-
cheat."
A further necessary element to bring a case within the
anti-failure statute is," that the deceased beneficiary, that is
the predeceased child or other relation of the testator, shall,
at the time of death, have left "lineal descendants" who "take
the estate so given by the will, in the same manner as the de-
visee would have done had he survived the testator."
The term "lineal descendants" as used in said section
7012, R. C. M. 1935 was construed by the California Court,
(when their statute' was identical in wording with ours) as
meaning "issue, regardless of the degree of relationship to
the ancestor. '
The California statutes dealing with lineal and collateral
consanguinity," are identical with our Sections 7076 to 7080,
R. C. M. 1935,' involved in the interpretation of the words
"lineal descendants."
"Supra, note 13.
"In re Fratt's Estate (1921) 60 Mont. 526, 199 P. 711; 4 PAGE, WILLS
(Lifetime Ed.) §1437, p. 190.
'Supra, note 16.
"Supra, note 13.
"Calif. Civ. Code §1310.
"'26 CAL JuL., Wills §257, p. 953; 26 CAL. JUp., Wills §257, p. 951, note
12.
"Calif. Civ. Code, §§1390 to 1393 incl.
'R. C. M. 1935 §7076: The degree of kindred is established by the num-
ber of generations, and each generation Is called a degree.
R. C. M. §7077: The series of degrees form the line; the series
of degrees between persons who descend from one another is called
direct or lineal consanguinity; and the series of degrees between per-
sons who do not descend from one another, but spring from a common
ancestor, Is called the collateral line or collateral consanguinity.
R. C. M. 1935 §7078: The direct line Is divided Into a direct line
descending and a direct line ascending. The first is that which con-
nects the ancestors with those who descend from him. The second is
that which connects a person with those from whom he descends.
R. C. M. 1935 §7079: In the direct line there are as many degrees
as there are generations. Thus, the son is, with regard to the father,
in the first degree; the grandson is the second; and vice versa with
regard to the father and grandfather toward the sons and grandsons.
R. C. M. 1935 §7080: In the collateral line, the degrees are counted
by generations from one of the relations up to the common ancestor,
and from the common ancestor to the other relations. In such com-
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The decisions are but few, on the point in question, in oth-
er jurisdictions with statutes similar to ours; however they
follow the California interpretation and statutory construc-
tion, declaring "issue" as being synonymous with "lineal de-
scendants," and vice versa.
"To this common-law rule the statute has created an
exception, which prevents the lapsing of a devise in the
circumstances mentioned, when the devisee was a relative
of the testator, and died before him, leaving lineal de-
scendants who take by substitution.'
While the devisee in the case at bar was a relative of
the testator, he did not leave any lineal descendants, that
is, any issue which is synonymous with lineal descendants,
and hence would not include his mother."
"It will be further noticed that the devise must be
made to a child or other relative, thus requiring the tes-
tator to select the child or relative to whom the word
'issue' shall attach."
"The foregoing constrains us to conclude that the
legislative intent and purpose can best be served by hold-
ing that the word 'issue' as used in the section of the
statute under construction means off-spring of his body,
and lineal descendants of such off-spring."'
"The word 'issue' in section 4841 means lineal de-
scendants of the devisee, in contradistinction to collateral
or ascending heirs.'
And it should be noted in passing, that an "adopted
child" would come within the designation of "lineal descend-
ants," though there are cases contrary to the rule."
The term "lineal descendants" of course does not include
brothers, nor stepsons, nor nieces nor sons-in-law.'
The term "lineal descendants" means lineal descendants
of such "child or other relation" of the deceased devisee,
putation the decedent is excluded, the relative included, and the an-
cestor counted but once. Thus, brothers are related in the second de-
gree; uncle and nephew in the third degree; cousins german in the
fourth, and so on.
'Keniston v. Adams, 89 Me. 290, 14 AtI. 203.
"Morse v. Hayden, 82 Me. 227, 19 AtI. 443, 444; cited in 22 WORDS AND
PHRASES (Per. Ed.) p. 758.
'In re Strelow's (Neb.) 220 N. W. 251; cited in 22 WORDS AND PHRASES
(Per. Ed.) p. 757.
"Dillender v. Wilson, 228 Ky. 758, 16 S.W. (2d) 173; cited in 22
WORDS AND PHRASES p. 757.
"722 WORDS AND PHRASES (Per. Ed.) p. 715; In re Pepin's Estate (1916)
53 Mont. 240, 163 P. 104.
"Cases cited in Vol. 11, ALEXANDER'S COMMENTARIES ON WULs, p. 1000.
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though such descendants may not be related by blood to the
testator."
Judging from the foregoing review of the statutes and
from the liberal tone of the better considered decisions, addi-
tional legislation on the subject would seem to be in order;
that is, legislative action designed to expand the scope of
R. C. M. 1935, Sec. 7012, by making it expressly applicable
to personalty as well as realty, to expand the class of bene-
ficiaries to include any person named in the will whether re-
lated to the testator or not, and to expand the term "lineal de-
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